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We build a directed search model of the labor market in which workers' transitions between unemployment,
employment, and across employers are endogenous. We prove the existence, uniqueness and efficiency
of a recursive equilibrium with the property that the distribution of workers across employment states
affects neither the agents' values and strategies nor the market tightness. Because of this property,
we are able to compute the equilibrium outside the non-stochastic steady-state. We use a calibrated
version of the model to measure the effect of productivity shocks on the US labor market. We find
that productivity shocks generate procyclical fluctuations in the rate at which unemployed workers
become employed and countercyclical fluctuations in the rate at which employed workers become
unemployed. Moreover, we find that productivity shocks generate large countercyclical fluctuations
in the number of vacancies opened for unemployed workers and even larger procyclical fluctuations
in the number of vacancies created for employed workers. Overall, productivity shocks alone can account
for 80 percent of unemployment volatility, 30 percent of vacancy volatility and for the nearly perfect

















From December 1969 to November 1970, the US unemployment rate increased from 3.5 to 6.1
percent. During this period, unemployment increased partly because the workers’ transition
rate from unemployment to employment (henceforth, the UE rate) dropped from 51 to 44
percent per month, and partly because the workers’ transition rate from employment to
unemployment (henceforth, the EU rate) increased by 30 percent.1 Similarly, during the
1953, 1957, 1979 and 1981 recessions, the unemployment rate increased because of both a
signiﬁcant decline in the UE rate and a signiﬁcant increase in the EU rate.
From January 2001 to November 2001, the US vacancy rate fell by approximately 30
percent. During this period, the number of workers moving from unemployment to employ-
ment declined from 3.25 to 3.23 millions per month (a 1 percent decline). In contrast, the
number of workers moving from one employer to the other declined from 4.5 to 3.7 millions
per month (a 17 percent decline).2 More generally, over the period between January 1994
and June 2006 (i.e., the period for which we have data on workers’ transitions from em-
ployer to employer), the correlation between the vacancy rate and the workers’ ﬂow from
unemployment to employment is -0.3, while the correlation between the vacancy rate and
the workers’ ﬂow across employers is 0.49.
The ﬁrst set of observations suggests that, in order to study the cyclical ﬂuctuations
of the unemployment rate, an economist should use a model in which both the UE and
EU rates are endogenous. The second set of observations suggests that, in order to study
the ﬂuctuations of the vacancy rate, an economist should use a model in which the hiring
ﬂows of both unemployed and employed workers are endogenous. When taken together,
these observations suggest that, in order to study the dynamics of the labor market at the
business cycle frequency, an economist should use a model that endogenizes the UE rate, the
1In Section 5.1, the reader will ﬁnd the deﬁnitions of the workers’ transition rate from unemployment to
employment, from employment to unemployment, and from employer to employer. Moreover, he will ﬁnd
the deﬁnitions of the unemployment and the vacancy rate.
2We measure the number of workers moving from unemployment to employment as the product between
civilian unemployment and the workers’ transition rate from unemployment to employment (as deﬁned in
Section 5.1). Similarly, we measure the number of workers moving from one employer to the other as the
product between civilian employment and the workers’ trasition rate from employer to employer (as deﬁned
in Section 5.1).
2EU rate, and the rate at employed workers move from one employer to the other (henceforth,
the EE rate).
1.2 Summary
In the ﬁrst part of this paper, we construct and analyze a search-theoretic model of the
labor market in which the workers’ transitions between employment, unemployment and
across diﬀerent employers are all endogenous. In the second part of the paper, we calibrate
the model in order to match the fundamental features of worker’s turnover in the US labor
market. In the last part of the paper, we use the calibrated model to measure the contribution
of aggregate productivity shocks to the cyclical volatility of US unemployment, vacancies and
other labor market variables over the period 1951 (I) - 2006 (II).
In our model, the labor market is populated by ex-ante homogeneous workers, each
endowed with one indivisible unit of labor, and ex-ante homogeneous ﬁrms, each operating
a technology that uses labor to produce ﬁnal goods. Moreover, in our model labor market,
trade is the outcome of a search-and-matching process. In particular, ﬁrms choose how many
vacancies to open and how much to oﬀer to the workers who ﬁll them. Simultaneously,
workers choose how much to demand for ﬁlling a vacancy. Then, some of the workers and
the ﬁrms who agree on the terms of trade successfully match and begin to produce the
ﬁnal good. We assume that the productivity of a match is the sum of an aggregate and an
idiosyncratic component.
In equilibrium, ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between opening diﬀerent types of vacancies, because
the vacancies that oﬀer relatively more generous terms of trade have higher ﬁlling rates at
the expense of lower ex post proﬁts. Workers, however, have strict preferences over diﬀerent
types of vacancies. In particular, unemployed workers prefer to search for vacancies that
oﬀer less generous terms of trade and are easier to ﬁnd (because they attract fewer workers),
while employed workers prefer to search for vacancies that oﬀer more generous terms of trade
but are harder to ﬁnd. Similarly, workers who are employed in more productive jobs prefer
to search for vacancies that oﬀer better terms of trade. In equilibrium, an employed worker
becomes unemployed when the idiosyncratic component of the productivity of his match
falls below an endogenous job-destruction threshold.
3When there is a positive shock to the aggregate component of labor productivity, ﬁrms
have incentive to open more vacancies per worker at all diﬀerent terms of trade. In response
to the increase in the vacancy/worker ratio, unemployed workers and (on average) employed
workers search for vacancies that not only oﬀer more generous terms of trade, but are also
easier to ﬁnd. Also, after a positive shock to the aggregate component of productivity,
workers and ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to keep some of the matches that they would have destroyed
previously. Overall, a positive shock to the aggregate component of productivity tends to
increase the UE and EE rates, and to decrease the EU rate.
In the second part of the paper, we calibrate the model to the US data. In particular,
we calibrate the parameters that describe the search technology so that the workers’ average
transition rates between employment, unemployment and across employers are the same in
the model as in the data. We calibrate the stochastic process for the idiosyncratic compo-
nent of productivity to approximate the empirical distribution of workers across diﬀerent
tenure lengths. Finally, we calibrate the stochastic process for the aggregate component of
productivity so that the average productivity of labor has the same statistical properties in
the model and in the data.
In the third part of the paper, we use the calibrated model to measure the contribution
of aggregate productivity shocks to the cyclical ﬂuctuations of the US labor market. We
ﬁnd that aggregate productivity shocks account for 40 percent of the observed volatility
of the UE rate, and for approximately all of the observed volatility of the EU rate. As
a result, aggregate productivity shocks alone can account for more than 80 percent of the
observed volatility of unemployment. Moreover, we ﬁnd that productivity shocks generate
countercyclical ﬂuctuations in the number of vacancies created for unemployed workers and
larger procyclical ﬂuctuations in the number of vacancies created for employed workers.
Overall, aggregate productivity shocks alone can account for more than 30 percent of the
cyclical volatility of the vacancy rate and for their nearly perfectly negative correlation with
unemployment. In light of these ﬁndings, we conclude that aggregate productivity shocks
may well be the fundamental cause of labor market volatility in the postwar US.
In the last part of the paper, we measure the contribution of aggregate productivity
shocks to the cyclical volatility of the US labor market using a version of our model in
4which the UE rate remains endogenous, but the EU and EE rates are exogenous because
matches are constrained to be homogeneous and workers are constrained to search only oﬀ
the job. This constrained version of our model coincides with the canonical search model
formulated by Pissarides (1985, 2000) and Shimer (2005). We ﬁnd that, when an economist
uses the constrained model, he not only ignores the eﬀect of productivity shocks on the EU
rate, but also underestimates the eﬀect of productivity shocks on the UE rate because he
mismeasures the elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies. Moreover,
when an economist uses the constrained model, he not only ignores the eﬀect of productivity
shocks on the number of vacancies created for employed workers, but also mismeasures the
eﬀect of productivity shocks on the number of vacancies created for unemployed workers.
Finally, when an economist uses the constrained model, he underestimates the magnitude
of productivity shocks in the postwar US. For all of these reasons, he incorrectly concludes
that aggregate productivity shocks account for less than 10 percent of the cyclical volatility
of unemployment and for less than 20 percent of the cyclical volatility of vacancies. These
ﬁndings conﬁrm our initial conjecture that, in order to understand the behavior of unem-
ployment and vacancies over the business cycle, an economist needs a model in which not
only the UE, but also the EU and EE rates are endogenous.
In this paper, we make two modeling choices that are relatively unusual in the on-the-job
search literature. First, we choose to model the search process as directed in the sense that
workers can direct their search towards vacancies that oﬀer particular terms of trade, rather
than random in the sense that workers have no information about the terms of trade oﬀered
by diﬀerent vacancies. We make this modeling choice because directed search seems a more
realistic description of a modern labor market. For example, in a recent survey of the US labor
market, Hall and Krueger (2008, Table 1) ﬁnd that 84 percent of white, male, non-college
workers either “knew exactly” of “had a pretty good idea” about how much their current
job would pay at the very early stages of their application process (namely, the time of their
ﬁrst interview). Another piece of evidence in support of directed search comes from Holzer,
Katz and Krueger (1991). Using data from the 1982 Employment Opportunity Pilot Project
Survey, they ﬁnd that ﬁrms in high-wage industries attract more applicants per vacancy than
ﬁrms in low-wage industries. Second, we choose to model employment contracts as complete.
5We ﬁnd this modeling choice compelling because a complete employment contract guarantees
that the worker-ﬁrm pair does not leave any gains from trade unexploited.
Because of directed search and complete contracts, our model has several useful proper-
ties. In particular, we can establish existence, uniqueness and eﬃciency of an equilibrium
in which the multi-dimensional distribution of workers across employment states (i.e. un-
employment and employment at diﬀerent jobs) does not aﬀect the agents’ value and policy
functions. We refer to this equilibrium as a Block Recursive Equilibrium (henceforth, BRE).
The existence of a BRE is an intuitive result. Under directed search, workers in diﬀerent em-
ployment states choose to look for diﬀerent vacancies because they have diﬀerent preferences
over the probability of ﬁnding a job and the value of the job. Therefore, the distribution of
workers across employment states does not aﬀect the ﬁrm’s beneﬁt from opening a vacancy
oﬀering particular terms of trade, the equilibrium applicant/vacancy ratio, and, ultimately,
the agents’ equilibrium values and strategies.3 The eﬃciency of a BRE is also intuitive.
Under the assumption of complete contracts, a worker internalizes the eﬀe c tt h a th i ss e a r c h
strategy has on his current employer. Under the assumption of directed search, a worker
internalizes the eﬀect that his search strategy has on his prospective employer. The unique-
ness of the BRE follows from the uniqueness of the eﬃcient allocation. In fact, all eﬃcient
equilibria (including those that are not block recursive) must have the same allocation as
that in the BRE.
T h e s ep r o p e r t i e so ft h eB R Ea r ev e r yu s e f u lf o rc a r r y i n go u tt h et y p eo fq u a n t i t a t i v e
analysis of labor market ﬂuctuations that we perform in this paper. First, since the distri-
bution of workers across diﬀerent employment states does not aﬀect the agents’ value and
policy functions, the BRE of our model can be solved in a stochastic environment without
incurring into the “curse of dimensionality” that typically aﬀects models with heterogeneous
agents. Second, since the BRE is unique, we can calibrate our model and use it for coun-
terfactual analysis without having to worry about equilibrium selection (within the class of
3Under the alternative assumption of random search, a BRE does not exist unless workers in diﬀerent
employment states (unemployment, and employment at diﬀerent jobs) all have the same reservation value
when they meet a vacancy. In the models of random search on the job by Burdett and Mortensen (1998),
Barlevy (2002), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), Burdett and Coles (2003) employed workers can return to
their job after meeting a vacancy. Therefore, these models do not admit a BRE. In the models by Mortensen
(1994) and Pissarides (1994, 2000), workers are not allowed to return to their previous employment position
after meeting a vacancy. Therefore, these models do admit a BRE.
6BRE).
1.3 Related Literature
In this paper, we contribute to the directed search literature by developing a model of directed
search in which workers can search oﬀ and on the job and labor contracts are complete. For
this model, we prove the existence, uniqueness and eﬃciency of a BRE, and characterize
the dynamics of this equilibrium in an environment with aggregate productivity shocks.
Montgomery (1991), Peters (1991), Shimer (1996), Moen (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer
(1999), Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) developed the earliest models of directed search.
These models diﬀer from ours because they abstract from on-the-job search. Delacroix and
Shi (2006) were the ﬁrst to study a model of directed search on the job. Their model diﬀers
from ours because it assumes that labor contracts are incomplete (i.e. labor contracts can
only specify a constant wage) and, hence, the equilibrium transitions of workers between
employment states are not eﬃcient. Moreover, the analysis in Delacroix and Shi (2006) is
restricted to the properties of the steady-state equilibrium, while the focus of our paper is
on business cycle dynamics. Shi (2008) was the ﬁrst to establish the existence of a BRE for
a model of directed search on the job. His model diﬀers from ours because it assumes that
contracts are incomplete (i.e. they can only specify wage as a function of tenure). In our
model contracts are complete and, for this reason, we can establish not only existence of a
BRE, but also uniqueness and eﬃciency.4 As mentioned above, uniqueness of the equilibrium
is a particularly important result because it allows us to calibrate the model and use it for
counterfactual analysis without having to worry about equilibrium selection. Moreover, Shi
(2008) establishes existence of a BRE in a deterministic environment, while in this paper we
prove existence of such equilibrium in an environment with aggregate shocks.
In this paper, we also contribute to the literature that studies business cycles using
4Moen and Rosen (2004) develop a model with on-the-job learning and on-the-job search in which the
search process is partially directed. In this model, workers in diﬀerent employment states (e.g. workers with
diﬀerent human capital or with diﬀerent wages) are required to search in diﬀerent segments of the labor
market but, within their segment, workers are allowed to direct their search towards particular vacancies.
For this model, Moen and Rosen (2004) establish the eﬃciency of the steady-state equilibrium. They also
argue that the eﬃciency of the steady-state equilibrium depends on the assumption of market segmentation.
Our paper suggests that this need not be the case. In our model, the equilibrium is eﬃcient (in and out
of the steady state) and the search process is completely directed (i.e. workers can choose to apply to any
vacancy they like).
7search-theoretic models of the labor market. In particular, we are the ﬁrst to measure the
contribution of aggregate productivity shocks to the volatility of the labor market by using
a search model of the labor market in which UE, EU, EE transitions and vacancy creation
are all endogenous and eﬃcient. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) were the ﬁrst to develop
a model of the labor market in which the UE and EU transitions are endogenous. However,
their model abstracts from EE transitions. Moreover, Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) do
n o tu s et h em o d e lt om e a s u r et h ee ﬀect of aggregate productivity shocks on the UE and EU
rate. Rather, they choose the parameters of the model so that aggregate productivity shocks
account for all of the observed volatility in unemployment and job creation, and they show
that the model can account for the covariance between unemployment, job creation and job
destruction.
Mortensen (1994) and Pissarides (1994, 2000) were the ﬁrst to develop models of the
labor market in which the UE, EU and EE transitions are endogenous. These models diﬀer
from ours because they assume that the search process is random. Moreover, they assume
that wages are determined as the outcome of a bargaining game in which the worker’s threat
point is always unemployment (independently of the worker’s employment state). Because
they make diﬀerent assumptions, these models have diﬀerent predictions about the eﬀect of
aggregate productivity shocks. For example, the assumption on wage determination implies
that a ﬁrm-worker pair extracts an ineﬃciently small fraction of the surplus generated by an
employer-to-employer transition. Therefore, a positive shock to productivity (which increases
the EE rate) generates a smaller increase in the value of a match (and, hence, in the UE
rate) in these models than in ours. Moreover, none of these papers performs the same
measurement exercise that we carry out in our paper. Pissarides (1994, 2000) does not
perform any quantitative analysis. Mortensen (1994) chooses the parameters of the model
so that productivity shocks account for all of the observed volatility of unemployment and
job creation and, then, he shows that the model can account for the covariance between
unemployment, job creation and job destruction. Finally, in a paper contemporaneous to
ours, Ramey (2008) used the model by Mortensen (1994) to measure the eﬀect of productivity
shocks. His measurement exercise diﬀers from ours because he chooses the parameters of the
model so that productivity shocks account for all of the volatility in the EU rate.5
5In the last four years, a number of search-theoretic models of the business cycle have been developed,
82 The Model
2.1 Physical Environment
Time is discrete and continues forever. The economy is populated by a continuum of workers
with measure one and by a continuum of ﬁrms with positive measure. Each worker has
the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
P∞
t=0 β
tct,w h e r ect ∈ R is the worker’s




tπt,w h e r eπt ∈ R is the ﬁrm’s proﬁti np e r i o d
t. In this economy, the labor market is organized in a continuum of submarkets indexed by
x ∈ R,w h e r ex denotes the value oﬀered to a worker in that submarket (explained further
below). In submarket x, the ratio between the number of jobs that are vacant and the
number of workers who are searching is denoted by θ(x) ∈ R+. We refer to θ(x) as the
tightness of submarket x.6
At the beginning of each period, the state of the economy can be summarized by the
triple (y,u,g) ≡ ψ ∈ Ψ.T h eﬁrst element of ψ denotes the aggregate component of labor
productivity, y ∈ Y = {y1,y 2,...yNy},w h e r eNy ≥ 2. The second element denotes the
measure of workers who are unemployed, u ∈ [0,1]. The last element is a function g : Z →
[0,1],w i t hg(z) denoting the measure of workers who are employed at a job with idiosyncratic
productivity z ∈ Z = {z1,z 2,...zNz},w h e r eNz ≥ 2.7 Clearly, u +
P
i g(zi)=1 .
Each period is divided into four stages: separation, search, matching and production.
During the ﬁrst stage, an employed worker becomes unemployed with probability τ ∈ [δ,1],
calibrated, and used to measure the eﬀect of aggregate productivity shocks on the labor market. Hall (2005)
considers a model of random search oﬀ the job in which wages are assumes to be rigid. Using a calibrated
version of the model, he ﬁnds that aggregate productivity shocks can generate large ﬂuctuations in vacancies
and unemployment. Menzio (2005) and Kennan (2008) develop random search models in which wages are set
as the outcome of an asymmetric information bargaining game between ﬁrms and workers. In these models,
wages are sticky because the informational rents of the ﬁrms are procyclical. Menzio and Moen (2008)
develop an alternative theory of wage stickiness. Nagypal (2007) develops a model of random search on the
job in which workers have private information about the amenity value of their jobs. Using a calibrated
version of the model, she ﬁnds that productivity shocks can account for a large fraction of the cyclical
volatility of vacancies and unemployment. Krause and Lubik (2007) reach similar conclusions using a model
o fs e g m e n t e ds e a r c ho nt h ej o bw i t ht w od i ﬀerent types of vacancies. Clearly, these models are very diﬀerent
from ours.
6In submarkets that are not visited by any workers, θ(x) is an out-of-equilibrium conjecture that helps
determine equilibrium behavior.
7Note that the assumption that Y and Z are ﬁnite sets is not necessary for establsihing any of the
theoretical results in this paper. We make this assumption only to simplify the notation.
9where τ is determined by the worker’s labor contract. The lower bound on τ denotes the
probability of exogenous job destruction, δ ∈ (0,1).
During the second stage, a worker gets the opportunity of searching for a job with a
probability that depends on his recent employment history. In particular, if the worker was
unemployed at the beginning of the period, he can search with probability λu ∈ [0,1].I f
the worker was employed at the beginning of the period and did not lose his job during the
separation stage, he can search with probability λe ∈ [0,1]. If the worker lost his job during
the separation stage, he cannot search. Conditional on being able to search, the worker
chooses which submarket to visit. Also, during the second stage, a ﬁrm chooses how many
vacancies to create and where to locate them. The cost of maintaining a vacancy for one
period is k>0. Both workers and ﬁrms take the tightness θ(x) parametrically.8
During the third stage, the workers and the vacancies in submarket x come together
through a frictional matching process. In particular, a worker ﬁnds a vacant job with proba-
bility p(θ(x)),w h e r ep : R+ → [0,1] is a twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing,
strictly concave function which satisﬁes the boundary conditions p(0) = 0, p(¯ θ)=1 .S i m -
ilarly, a vacancy ﬁnds a worker with probability q(θ(x)),w h e r eq : R+ → [0,1] is a twice
continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly decreasing function such that q(θ)=θ
−1p(θ), q(0) = 1,
and limθ→∞ q(θ)=0 . The properties of the functions p and q are meant to capture the re-
alistic feature that, the tighter is the submarket, the higher is the probability that a worker
ﬁnds a vacancy and the lower is the probability that a vacancy ﬁnds a worker.9
When a ﬁrm and a worker meet in submarket x,t h eﬁrm has to oﬀer to the worker an
employment contract that is worth x in lifetime utility. If the worker rejects the oﬀer of the
ﬁrm (an event that does not occur along the equilibrium path), he returns to his previous
employment state (unemployment, or employment at some other ﬁrm). If the worker accepts
the oﬀer, he leaves his previous employment state and starts an employment relationship with
the ﬁrm. After the relationship has started, the worker and the ﬁrm observe the idiosyncratic
8That is, workers and ﬁrms treat the tightness θ(x) just like households and ﬁrms treat prices in a
Walrasian Equilibrium.
9In this paper, we assume that the labor market is organized in a continuum of submarkets indexed by
x,w h e r ex denotes the value oﬀered to a worker in that submarket. Moreover, we assume that workers
choose which submarket to visit and that ﬁrms choose where to locate their vacancies. This model of the
search-and-matching process generates the same equilibrium conditions as the more naturalistic model in
which ﬁrms post employment contracts for their vacancies and workers choose where to apply for a job.
10productivity ˜ z ∈ Z of their match, where ˜ z is a random variable with a density function
f : Z → [0,1]. The idiosyncratic component of productivity is constant throughout the
duration of the match.10
During the last stage, an unemployed worker produces and consumes b units of output.
Aw o r k e re m p l o y e da taj o bz produces y+z units of output and consumes w of them, where
w is speciﬁed by the worker’s labor contract. At the end of the last stage, nature draws next
period’s aggregate productivity ˆ y from the probability distribution φ(ˆ y|y), φ : Y ×Y → [0,1].
Throughout this paper, the caret indicates variables or functions in the next period.
2.2 Contractual Environment
In this paper, we assume that employment contracts are complete. That is, an employment
contract prescribes the wage paid by the employer to the employee, the probability that the
employee becomes unemployed, and the submarket where the employee looks for alternative
employment opportunities. These prescriptions are contingent on calendar time and on the
entire history of the match between the employer and the employee. We assume that con-
tracts are complete because they guarantee that an employer and an employee will manage
to exploit all the possible gains from trade. This seems the most natural outcome in an
unregulated labor market like the US’s, even though this outcome may very well be imple-
mented with (explicit or implicit) contracts that look diﬀerent from the complete contracts
that we consider here.
To specify the contracts, let the history of a match be a vector {z;yt} ∈ Z × Y t,w h e r e
z is the match-speciﬁc component of productivity and yt = {y1,y 2,...y t} is the sequence of
realizations of the aggregate component of productivity since the inception of the match.11
An employment contract a ∈ ANz is an allocation {wt,τt,n t}∞
t=0.T h e ﬁrst element of a
10We assume that the worker must leave his previous employment state before observing the productivity
of the new match in order to capture (in an admittedly stark way) the idea that it takes time to learn about
the quality of a new employment relationship. We could easily relax this assumption by letting the worker
observe a noisy signal about the quality of the new match before he has to choose where to work. Also, we
could easily relax the assumption that the idiosyncratic productivity of a match is constant over time.
11In general, a complete contract should specify w, τ,a n dn as functions of the match-speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t
of productivity z and the sequence of realizations of the aggregate state of the economy since the inception of
the match, ψ
t = {ψ1,ψ2,...ψt}. However, in this paper, we are interested in equilibria in which the tightness
function θ(x) depends on the aggregate state of the economy ψ =( y,u,g) only through y and not through
the entire distribution of workers across employment states. In these equilibria, the history {z;yt} provides
enough contingencies for a contract to be eﬃcient.
11denotes the wage as a function of the worker’s tenure t and the history of the match {z;yt},
where wt : Z×Y t → R. The second element denotes the separation probability as a function
of the tenure t and the history {z,yt+1},w h e r eτt : Z × Y t+1 → [δ,1]. The last element
denotes the submarket where the worker searches while on the job as a function of the tenure
t and the history {z,yt+1},w h e r ent : Z × Y t+1 → R.
I nt h er e m a i n d e ro ft h ep a p e r ,w el e ta(z;yt) ∈ A denote the allocation prescribed by
the employment contract a after the history {z;yt} is realized. Note that a(z;yt) is equal to
{wt(z;yt),τt(z;yt, ˆ y),n t(z;yt, ˆ y)} ∪ a(z;yt, ˆ y).
3 Block Recursive Equilibrium
In this paper, we are interested in Block Recursive Equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which the
agents’ values, optimal strategies, and the market tightness depend on the aggregate state
of the economy, ψ, only through the aggregate state of the economy, y, and not through the
multi-dimensional distribution of workers across diﬀerent employment states, (u,g).
3.1 Worker’s Problem
Consider a worker who has received the opportunity to look for a job at the beginning
of the search stage. Let θ(x;y) denote the equilibrium tightness of submarket x.I f t h e
worker visits submarket x, he succeeds in ﬁnding a job with probability p(θ(x;y)),a n dh e
fails with probability 1 − p(θ(x;y)). If he succeeds, he enters the production stage in a
new employment relationship which gives him the lifetime expected utility x.I fh ef a i l s ,h e
enters the production stage in the same employment position that he previously held, which
gives him the lifetime expected utility υ. Therefore, conditional on visiting submarket x,t h e
worker’s lifetime expected utility at the beginning of the search stage is υ+p(θ(x;y))(x − υ).
Conditional on choosing x optimally12, the worker’s lifetime expected utility is υ + D(υ;y),
where
D(υ;y)=m a x x p(θ(x;y))(x − υ). (R1)
Denote m(υ;y) as the solution for x to the maximization problem in (R1).
12This qualiﬁcation is relevant. When the worker is unemployed, he chooses x to maximize his lifetime
utility. However, when the worker is employed, he chooses x according to the prescriptions of his labor
contract, rather than to maximize his lifetime utility.
12Next, consider an unemployed worker at the beginning of the production stage, and
denote as U(y) his lifetime utility. In the current period, the worker produces and consumes
b units of output. In the next period, the worker enters the search stage without a job and
has the opportunity to look for one with probability λu. Therefore, the worker’s lifetime
utility U(y) is equal to
U(y)=b + βE[U(ˆ y)+λuD(U(ˆ y); ˆ y)].( R 2 )
Throughout this paper, E denotes the conditional expectation on ˆ y, calculated with the
distribution φ(ˆ y|y).
3.2 Joint Value of a Match
Consider a ﬁrm and a worker who are matched at the beginning of the production stage. The
history of their match is {z,yt}. The allocation prescribed by their employment contract
after the history {z;yt} has realized is a = {w,τ,n} ∪ ˆ a.D e n o t ea sW(z;y|a) the lifetime
utility of the worker, and as J(z;y|a) the lifetime proﬁts of the ﬁrm.
In the current period, the worker consumes w units of output. During the next separation
stage, the worker loses his job with probability τ, and keeps it with probability 1−τ.I nt h e
ﬁrst case, the worker enters the search stage unemployed and does not have the opportunity
to look for a new job. In the second case, the worker enters the search stage employed and,
with probability λe, he has the opportunity to look for an alternative job in submarket n.
Therefore, the worker’s lifetime utility W(z;y|a) is equal to
W(z;y|a)= w + βE{τ(ˆ y)U(ˆ y)+[ 1− τ(ˆ y)]W(z;ˆ y|ˆ a(ˆ y))}+
+βE{[1 − τ(ˆ y)]λep(θ(n(ˆ y); ˆ y))[n(ˆ y) − W(z;ˆ y|ˆ a(ˆ y))]}.
(R3)
In the current period, the ﬁrm’s proﬁti sy + z − w. During the next separation stage,
the ﬁrm loses the worker with probability τ. During the next matching stage, the ﬁrm loses
the worker with probability (1−τ)λep(θ(n)). The probability that the ﬁrm keeps the worker
until the next production stage is (1−τ)( 1−λep(θ(n))). Therefore, the ﬁrm’s lifetime proﬁts
J(z;y|a) are equal to
J(z;y|a)=y + z − w + βE{[1 − τ(ˆ y)][1 − λep(θ(n(ˆ y); ˆ y))]J(z;ˆ y|ˆ a(ˆ y))}. (R4)
13Now, consider the hypothetical problem of choosing the allocation a in order to maximize
the sum of the worker’s lifetime utility and the ﬁrm’s lifetime proﬁts from the match. As we
prove in the appendix, the maximized joint value of the match V (z;y) is
V (z;y)= m a x
w,τ,n y + z + βE{τ(ˆ y)U(ˆ y)+[ 1− τ(ˆ y)]V (z;ˆ y)}+
+βλeE{[1 − τ(ˆ y)]p(θ(n(ˆ y); ˆ y))[n(ˆ y) − V (z;ˆ y)]},
w ∈ R,τ : Y → [δ,1],n : Y → R.
(R5)





t=0 that maximizes the joint value of the match. At the separation stage, a∗(z;y)
speciﬁes that the worker and the ﬁrm should voluntarily break up if and only if the sum of
their values is greater when they are apart than when they are together. That is, τ∗
t−1(yt)=1
iﬀ U(yt) is greater than V (z;yt)+λeD(V (z;yt),y t), and τ∗
t(yt)=δ otherwise. At the search
stage, the allocation speciﬁes that the worker should visit the submarket that maximizes
the product of the probability of ﬁnding a job and the worker’s and ﬁrm’s joint value from
ﬁnding a job, i.e. n∗
t−1(yt)=m(V (z;yt);yt). Finally, since the wage is just a transfer from
the ﬁrm to the worker and both parties are risk neutral, the allocation may specify any
{w∗
t}∞
t=0. Therefore, the allocation a∗(z;y) may attain any division of the joint value of the
match V (z;y) between the ﬁrm and the worker.
3.3 Firm’s Problem
When a ﬁrm meets a worker in submarket x, it chooses an employment contract that maxi-
mizes its expected proﬁts subject to providing the worker with the lifetime utility x. Formally,








What is the solution to (R6)? First, consider a generic contract a. Conditional on any
realization z of the idiosyncratic component of productivity, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts J(z;y|a(z))
cannot be greater than the diﬀerence between the maximized joint value of the match,
V (z;y), and the worker’s lifetime utility, W(z;y|a(z)). Therefore, if the contract a provides
the worker with the expected lifetime utility x,t h eﬁrm’s expected proﬁt sc a n n o tb eg r e a t e r
than
P
i V (zi;y)f(zi)−x. Next, consider the contract a∗ = {a∗(zi;y)}i. Conditional on any
14realization z of the idiosyncratic component of productivity, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts J(z;y|a∗(z;y))
are equal to the diﬀerence between the maximized joint value of the match, V (z;y),a n dt h e
worker’s lifetime utility, W(z;y|a∗(z;y)). Therefore, for the appropriate selection of wages,
the contract a∗ provides the worker with the expected lifetime utility x and the ﬁrm with the
expected proﬁts
P
i V (zi;y)f(zi)−x. These observations lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Optimal Contract) (i) The ﬁrm’s value from meeting a worker in submarket
x is
P
i V (zi;y)f(zi) − x. (ii) Any employment contract that solves the ﬁrm’s problem (R6)
prescribes the allocation: (a) nt−1(z;yt)=m(V (z;yt);yt), for all {z;yt} ∈ Z × Y t, t =
1,2,...;( b )τt−1(z;yt)=d(z;yt), for all {z;yt} ∈ Z × Y t, t =1 ,2,...,w h e r ed(z;y)=1iﬀ
U(y) >V(z;y)+λeD(V (z;y);y) and d∗(z;y)=δ otherwise.
Proof. In Appendix B. ¥
In the remainder of the paper, we are going to describe the prescriptions of the opti-




During the search stage, a ﬁrm chooses how many vacancies to create and where to lo-
cate them. The ﬁrm’s beneﬁt of creating a vacancy in submarket x is the product be-
tween the probability of meeting a worker, q(θ(x;y)), and the value of meeting a worker,
P
i V (zi;y)f(zi) − x.T h eﬁrm’s cost of creating a vacancy in submarket x is k.W h e nt h e
beneﬁt is strictly smaller than the cost, the ﬁrm’s optimal policy is to create no vacancies in
x. When the beneﬁt is strictly greater than the cost, the ﬁrm’s optimal policy is to create
inﬁnitely many vacancies in x.A n d w h e n t h e b e n e ﬁta n dt h ec o s ta r ee q u a l ,t h eﬁrm’s
proﬁts are independent from the number of vacancies it creates in submarket x.
In any submarket that is visited by a positive number of workers, the tightness θ(x;y) is
consistent with the ﬁrm’s optimal creation strategy if and only if
q(θ(x;y))[
P
i V (zi;y)f(zi) − x] ≤ k, (R7)
and θ(x;y) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. In any submarket that workers do not visit,
the tightness θ(x;y) is consistent with the ﬁrm’s optimal creation strategy if and only if
15q(θ(x;y)) · [
P
i V (zi;y)f(zi) − x] is smaller or equal than k. However, following the rest of
t h el i t e r a t u r eo nd i r e c t e ds e a r c ho nt h ej o b( i . e . S h i2 0 0 8a n dM e n z i oa n dS h i2 0 0 9 ) ,w e
restrict attention to equilibria in which the tightness θ(x;y) satisﬁes condition (R7) in every
submarket.13
3.5 Laws of Motion
From the optimal policy functions, we can compute the probability that a worker transits
from one employment state to the other. First, consider a worker who is unemployed at the
beginning of the period. Let θu(y) denote θ(m(U(y);y);y). Then, at the end of the period,
the worker is still unemployed with probability 1−λup(θu(y)), and he is employed at job of
type ˆ z with probability λup(θu(y))f(ˆ z). Next, consider a worker who is employed at a job of
type z at the beginning of the period. Let θz(z;y) denote θ(m(V (z;y);y);y). Then, at the
end of the period, the worker is unemployed with probability d(z;y).H ei se m p l o y e d a t a
job of type ˆ z 6= z with probability [1−d(z;y)] λep(θz(z;y))f(ˆ z), and at a job of type z with
probability [1 − d(z;y)] {1 − λep(θz(z;y))[1 − f(z)]}.
From these transition probabilities, we can compute the laws of motion for the measure
of unemployed workers and for the measure of workers employed at each idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity z. In particular, the measure of workers who are unemployed at the end of the
period is:
ˆ u = u(1 − λup(θu(y))) +
P
i d(zi;y)g(zi).( R 8 )
Similarly, the measure of workers who, at the end of the period, are employed at a job with
idiosyncratic productivity z is:
ˆ g(z)=h(ψ)f(z)+( 1− d(z;y))(1 − λep(θz(z;y)))g(z). (R9)
The function h(ψ) denotes the measure of workers who are hired during the matching stage
13The literature on directed search oﬀ the job (e.g. Moen 1997, Acemoglu and Shimer 1999, Menzio 2007)
assumes that, in a submarket that is not active in equilibrium, the tightness is such that a worker would be
indiﬀerent between visiting that submarket and the submarket that he visits in equilibrium. In models with
directed search on the job, workers are heterogeneous and, hence, it is more convenient to use the ﬁrm’s
indiﬀerence condition (R7) to pin down the tightness of inactive submarkets.




3.6 Deﬁnition of Block Recursive Equilibrium
T h ep r e v i o u sp a r a g r a p h sm o t i v a t et h ef o l l o w i n gd e ﬁnition of equilibrium.
Definition 1: A Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE) consists of a market tightness function
θ
∗ : R×Y → R+; a search value function D∗ : R×Y → R, and policy function m∗ : R×Y →
R; an unemployment value function U∗ : Y → R; a match value function V ∗ : Z × Y → R;
a separation function d∗ : Z × Y → R; and the laws of motion ˆ u∗ : Ψ → [0,1],a n d
ˆ g∗ : Z × Ψ → [0,1] for unemployment and employment. These functions are such that:
(i) θ
∗ satisﬁes (R7) for all (x,ψ) ∈ R × Ψ;
(ii) D∗ satisﬁes (R1) for all (V,ψ) ∈ R × Ψ, and m∗ is the associated policy function;
(iii) U∗ satisﬁes (R2) for all ψ ∈ Ψ;
(iv) V ∗ satisﬁes (R6) for all (z,ψ) ∈ Z × Ψ,a n dd∗ is the associated policy function;
(v) ˆ u∗ and ˆ g∗ satisfy (R8) and (R9) for all ψ ∈ Ψ.
In a Block Recursive Equilibrium, the agent’s value and policy functions and the mar-
ket tightness function depend on the aggregate state of the economy, ψ, only through the
aggregate component of productivity, y, and not through the entire distribution of workers
across diﬀerent employment states, (u,g). Therefore, solving the BRE amounts to solving
a simple system of functional equations in which the unknown functions have either one or
two arguments (independently from the cardinality of Z). This is the same type of system
that economists routinely solve to ﬁnd the equilibrium of representative agent models.
4 Existence, Uniqueness and Eﬃciency
In this section, we prove existence, uniqueness and eﬃciency of a Block Recursive Equilib-
rium. To this aim, we ﬁrst formulate the problem of the social planner and characterize
its solution. Next, we prove that, if a Block Recursive Equilibrium exists, then it generates
the same allocation that solves the planner’s problem. Moreover, we prove that a BRE can
17always be built from the solution to the planner’s problem. We conclude the section by
providing a qualitative characterization of the equilibrium in and out of the steady state.
4.1 Social Planner’s Problem
At the beginning of the period, the social planner observes the state of the economy ψ =
{y,u,g}. At the separation stage, he chooses the destruction probability d(z) for matches
with idiosyncratic productivity z, d : Z → [δ,1]. At the search stage, he chooses the tightness
θu for the submarket where he sends unemployed workers to look for jobs,θ u ∈ R+,a n d
the tightness θz(z) for the submarket where he sends workers employed on jobs of type z to
l o o kf o rb e t t e rj o b s ,θz : Z → R+. The choices of d, θu and θz determine the distribution
of workers across employment states at the production stage and, hence, at the beginning
of next period. The social planner’s objective is to maximize the sum of current and future
aggregate consumption discounted at the rate β. Denote the planner’s value function as
s0(ψ). The planner’s problem is
s0(ψ)=m a x d,θu,θz F(d,θu,θ z|ψ)+βEs0(ˆ ψ)
s.t. ˆ u = u[1 − λup(θu)] +
P
i d(zi)g(zi),
ˆ g(z)=h(ψ)f(z)+[ 1− d(z)][1 − λep(θz(z))]g(z),
h(ψ)=λup(θu)u + λe
P
i [1 − d(zi)]p(θz(zi))g(zi),
(P1)
where F is the current period’s aggregate consumption given by
F(d,θu,θ z|ψ)=ˆ ub +
P
i(y + zi)ˆ g(zi) − k[λuuθu + λe
P
i(1 − d(zi))g(zi)θz(zi)].
The planner’s value function s0(ψ) is linear in both the measure u of workers who are
unemployed and the measure g(z) of workers who are employed at jobs with idiosyncratic








z(zi;y)g(zi).( P 2 )
The coeﬃcient s0
u(y) can be interpreted as the diﬀerence between the present value of output
produced by a worker who is currently unemployed and the present value of output invested
in creating vacancies for him. Similarly, the coeﬃcient s0
z(z;y) can be interpreted as the
present value of net output produced by a worker who is currently employed at a job of type
z. In line with basic economic intuition, the coeﬃcient s0
z(z;y) is increasing in z.T h e s e
18properties of the planner’s value function are established in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Social Planner’s Problem) (i) The value of the plan s0 : Ψ → R is the
unique solution to the functional equation (P1). (ii) There exist functions s0
u : Y → R and
s0





(iii) The function s0
z(zi;y) is non-decreasing in z.
Proof. In Appendix C. ¥
The planner’s assignment of vacancies to the submarket with unemployed workers is
optimal only if
k ≥ p




z(zi;ˆ y)f(zi) − s
0
u(ˆ y)]} (P3)
and θu ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. This condition is easy to understand. The left
hand side of (P3) is the cost of assigning an extra vacancy to the submarket with unemployed
workers. The right hand side of (P3) is the expected beneﬁt from such an extra vacancy, given
by the product of two terms. The ﬁrst term, p0(θu), is the number of unemployed workers
who ﬁnd a job because of the extra vacancy. The second term is the diﬀerence between the
present value of net output produced by an employed and an unemployed worker, measured
at the production stage. Notice that, since the left hand side is independent from θu and
the right hand side is strictly decreasing, the optimality condition (P3) admits a unique
solution in each aggregate state ψ.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c e( P 3 )d e p e n d so nt h ea g g r e g a t es t a t eo f
the economy only through y, the optimal policy is a function θ
0
u : Y → R+.
The planner’s assignment of vacancies to the submarket with workers who are employed






z(zi;ˆ y)f(zi) − s
0
z(z;ˆ y)]} (P4)
and θz(z), with complementary slackness. The interpretation of the optimality condition
(P4) is similar to that of (P3), except that the extra vacancy is assigned to a submarket
populated by workers who are employed at jobs with idiosyncratic productivity z rather
than unemployed. As it is the case for (P3), the optimality condition (P4) admits a unique
solution for θz(z) in each aggregate state ψ. Moreover, since (P4) depends on the aggregate
state of the economy ψ only through y, the optimal policy is a function θ
0
z : Z × Y → R+.
19The planner’s choice of the destruction probability for matches with idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity z is optimal if and only if d(z)=1whenever
b + βEs0

















and d(z)=δ otherwise. The interpretation of this condition is straightforward. The left
hand side of (P5) is the present value of net output produced by a worker who is unemployed
at the beginning of the production stage. The right hand side of (P5) is the present value of
net output produced by a worker who is employed at a job with idiosyncratic productivity z
at the beginning of the search stage. Clearly, the optimality condition (P5) admits only one
solution for d(z) in each aggregate state ψ. Moreover, since (P5) depends on the aggregate
state of the economy ψ only y,t h eo p t i m a lp o l i c yi saf u n c t i o nd0 : Z × Y → [δ,1].
Finally, the derivative of the social planner’s value function with respect to the measure



















Similarly, the derivative of the social planner’s value function with respect to the measure
of workers employed at jobs of type z is:
s0
z(z;y)= d0(z;y)[b + βEs0



















Denote with {D∗,m ∗,U∗,V∗,d ∗,θ
∗} a Block Recursive Equilibrium. The market tightness
function θ
∗(x;y) is derived from the equilibrium condition (R7). In particular, let ˜ x(y)
denote the diﬀerence between the ﬁrm’s and worker’s joint value of a match and the cost of a
vacancy, i.e. ˜ x(y) ≡
P
i V ∗(zi;y)f(zi)−k. In all of the submarkets where workers are oﬀered
less than ˜ x(y), the equilibrium tightness is strictly positive and such that the ﬁrm’s beneﬁt
from opening a vacancy is equal to the cost. As the lifetime utility oﬀered to the workers
approaches ˜ x(y), the equilibrium tightness converges towards zero. In all of the submarkets
20w h e r ew o r k e r sa r eo ﬀered more than ˜ x(y), θ







i V ∗(zi;y)f(zi) − x)) if x ≤ ˜ x(y),
0i f x>˜ x(y). (E1)
The search policy function m∗(υ;y) satisﬁes the equilibrium condition (R1). That is,
m∗(υ;y) maximizes the product between the worker’s probability of ﬁnding a job, i.e.
p(θ
∗(x;y)), and the worker’s value of taking the job and leaving his previous employment
position, i.e. x − υ. Equation (E1) implies that the worker’s probability of ﬁnding a
job is zero in all submarkets x>˜ x(y). Equation (E1) also implies that, in all submar-
kets x ≤ ˜ x(y), the worker’s value of a job is equal to the diﬀerence between the worker’s
and ﬁrm’s joint value of a match and the ﬁrm’s expected cost of creating a match, i.e.
x =
P
i V ∗(zi;y)f(zi) − k/q(θ








∗(zi;y)f(zi) − υ]}. (E2)
In equilibrium, whenever an unemployed worker has the opportunity to search, he visits
submarket m∗(U∗(y);y).L e tθ
∗
u(y) denote the tightness of this submarket. In equilibrium,
whenever a worker employed at a job with idiosyncratic productivity z has the opportunity
to search, he visits submarket m∗(V ∗(z;y);y).L e t θ
∗
z(z;y) denote the tightness of this
submarket. From equation (E2), it follows that the tightness θ
∗











u(y) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. Similarly, from equation (E2), it follows that
the tightness θ










z(z;y) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness.
In equilibrium, the lifetime utility of an unemployed worker is U∗(y) at the beginning
of the production stage. Let s∗
u(y) denote the lifetime utility of an unemployed worker at
the beginning of the separation stage, i.e. s∗
u(y)=U∗(y)+λuD(U∗(y);y). In equilibrium,
the worker’s and ﬁrm’s joint value of a match is V ∗(z;y) at the beginning of the production
21stage. Let s∗
z(z;y) denote the worker’s and ﬁrm’s joint value of a match at the beginning
of the separation stage, i.e. s∗
z(z;y) equals the sum between d∗(z;y) · U∗(z;y) and (1 −















And the equilibrium condition (R5) implies that
s∗
z(z;y)= d∗(z;y)[b + βEs∗
u(ˆ y)] − [1 − d∗(z;y)]kλeθ
∗
z(z;y)+
+[1− d∗(z;y)][1 − λep(θ
∗









where d∗(z;y) is equal to 1 if
b + βEs∗




























z}. This system of equations admits only one solution. Therefore, a
BRE is unique and is eﬃcient. Moreover, the equations (E3)—(E7) are not only necessary
for a BRE, but they are also suﬃcient. Therefore, a BRE can always be constructed from
the solution to the social planner’s problem. We summarize these ﬁndings in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3 (Existence, Uniqueness and Eﬃciency) (i) A Block Recursive Equilibrium ex-
ists. (ii) Let {D∗,m ∗,U∗,V∗,d ∗,θ




∗(m∗(U∗(y);y);y),a n dl e tθ
∗
z(z;y) denote θ










Proof: In the Appendix D. ¥
The existence of a BRE is an intuitive result. Under directed search, workers in diﬀer-
ent employment states choose to apply for diﬀerent vacancies because they have diﬀerent
preferences over the probability of getting a job and the value oﬀered by a job. For this
reason, the distribution of workers across diﬀerent employment states does not aﬀect the
22ﬁrm’s expected beneﬁt from meeting an applicant in submarket x.M o r e o v e r , t h e ﬁrm’s
cost from opening a vacancy in submarket x is independent from the distribution of workers
across employment states. Therefore, the ﬁrm’s probability of meeting an applicant (and,
h e n c e ,t h ev a c a n c y / a p p l i c a n tr a t i o )m u s ta l s ob ei n d e p e n d e n tf r o mt h ew o r k e r s ’d i s t r i b u -
tion. In turn, this implies that the agents’ values and strategies are independent from the
workers’ distribution. The eﬃciency of a BRE is an intuitive result as well. Under complete
contracts, a worker internalizes the eﬀect that his decisions have on his current employer.
Under directed search, the value to a worker from ﬁlling a vacant job is equal to the diﬀer-
ence between the worker’s and ﬁrm’s joint value of the job and the ﬁrm’s cost of creating
the job. For this reason, under directed search, a worker also internalizes the eﬀect of his job
application decision on his prospective employer. Finally, the uniqueness of a BRE follows
from the uniqueness of the eﬃcient allocation. Note that since we established uniqueness
of the eﬃcient allocation without requiring the allocation to be block recursive, all eﬃcient
equilibria (including those that are not block recursive) must have the same allocation as
that in the BRE.
4.3 Characterization of Equilibrium
Now, we are in the position to characterize the equilibrium of our model economy. Equation
(E3) implies that the tightness of the submarket visited by an unemployed worker is an
increasing function of the diﬀerence between the value of a new match, i.e.
P
V ∗(zi;y)f(zi),
and the value of unemployment, i.e. U∗(y). Equation (E4) implies that the tightness of the
submarket visited by an employed worker is an increasing function of the diﬀerence between
the value of a new match and the value of his current match. Since the value of a match is
increasing in the idiosyncratic component of its productivity, θ
∗
z(z;y) i sad e c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o n
of z.
Equation (E7) characterizes the workers’ transitions from employment to unemployment.
In particular, an employed worker becomes unemployed with probability 1 if the value of his
match at the beginning of the separation stage is smaller than the value of unemployment.
Otherwise, he becomes unemployed with probability δ. Since the value of a match is strictly
increasing in the idiosyncratic component of productivity, there exists a zeu(y) such that
23d∗(z;y)=1for all z<z eu(y) and d∗(z;y)=δ for all.z ≥ zeu(y).





and y, we can easily compute it. For the parameter values in Table 2, the diﬀerence between
the value of a match and the value of unemployment is increasing in the aggregate component
of productivity. On the one hand, this implies that the tightness of the submarket visited
by unemployed workers is an increasing function of y. On the other hand, this implies that
the probability that a worker employed at a job of type z is a decreasing function of y.
For the parameter values in Table 2, the diﬀerence between the value of a new match
and the value of a match with a relatively low idiosyncratic productivity is increasing in y.
The diﬀerence between the value of a new match and a relatively high productivity match
is decreasing in y. Therefore, the eﬀect that a positive shock to aggregate productivity has
on the tightness of the submarket visited by an employed worker depends on the quality of
his job.
5C a l i b r a t i o n
We begin this section by describing the dataset that we are going to use to calibrate our
model. This dataset includes all the information used by Shimer (2005) to calibrate the
textbook search model of Pissarides (1985). However, since our model has more parameters
than Pissarides’, the dataset contains additional information about the job-to-job transition
rate and the tenure distribution. In the second part of the section, we describe and motivate
the calibration strategy. In particular, we explain why we can recover the distribution of
idiosyncratic productivities from the tenure distribution. In the last part of the section, we
report the results of the calibration.
5.1 Data
We measure quarterly productivity as the CPS output per worker in the non-farm business
sector, and unemployment as a 3-month average of the CPS monthly rate of unemployment
in the civilian population. We construct the cyclical component of these two variables as
the diﬀerence between the log of the raw data and an HP trend (with the usual smoothing
parameter 1600). Over the period between 1951(I) and 2006(II), the average of our measure
24of productivity is 82 (100 being productivity in 1992) and the average of our measure of
unemployment is 5.6 percent. Over the same period, the cyclical components of productivity
and unemployment move together. However, cyclical unemployment is more than 10 times
as volatile as productivity. These and other statistics are reported in Table 1.
We measure the rate at which employed workers become unemployed (the EU rate) as
well as the rate at which unemployed workers become employed (the UE rate) using the
methodology developed by Shimer (2005).14 Speciﬁcally, we measure the EU rate in month
t as heu
t = us
t+1/(1 − ut),w h e r eus
t+1 is the CPS short-term unemployment rate in month
t +1 ,a n dut is the CPS unemployment rate. We measure the UE rate in month t as
hue
t =1− (ut+1 − us
t+1)/ut. Then, we construct the quarterly transition rates by taking
3-month averages of heu
t and hue
t . Over the period between 1951(I) and 2006(II), the average
EU rate is 2.6 percent, and the average UE rate is 45 percent. Over this period, the cyclical
component of the EU rate is positively correlated with cyclical unemployment and it is
approximately 60 percent as volatile. The cyclical component of the UE rate is negatively
correlated with unemployment and it is approximately 65 percent as volatile.
The rate at which workers move from employer to employer is measured by Nagypál
(2008) from the CPS microdata. Speciﬁcally, she measures the EE rate in month t as
hee
t = fee
t /et,w h e r efee
t is the number of workers who are employed at diﬀerent ﬁrms in
months t and t +1 ,a n det is the number of workers who are employed in month t.O v e r
t h ep e r i o db e t w e e n1 9 9 4 ( I )a n d2 0 0 6 ( I I ) ,t h ea v e r a g eE Er a t ei s2 . 9p e r c e n t . O v e rt h e
same period, the cyclical component of the EE rate is negatively correlated with cyclical
unemployment and it is approximately 30 percent as volatile. Prior to 1994, Nagypál’s
14There are three diﬀerences between the measures of the UE and EU transition rates used by Shimer (2005)
and those used in this paper. First, in order to correct for the change in the measurement of unemployment
duration caused by the 1994 redesign of the CPS, Shimer multiplies the oﬃcial short-term unemployment
by 1.1 in each month from February 1994 on. In this paper, we follow Elsby, Michaels and Solon (2009) who
argue that the appropriate correction coeﬃcient for short-term unemployment is not 1.1 but 1.15. Second,
Shimer corrects the raw measures of worker’s transition rates for time aggregation bias. The extent of this
bias, as well as the appropriateness of the corrections suggested by Shimer, is based on the hypothesis that
a worker’s transition rate from one state to the other does not depend on how long he has been in that
state. However, in our model, the worker’s transition rates are duration dependent and Shimer’s corrections
are not appropriate. (Indeed, if one takes our monthly model literally, there is no aggregation bias at all.)
Therefore, in this paper, we do not correct the workers’ transition rates. Nevertheless, as a robustness check,
we performed our measurement exercise using Shimer’s corrections (both in the data and in the model) and
our ﬁndings did not change much. Finally, Shimer computes the cyclical component of the log of quarterly
workers’ transition rates by using an HP-ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter of 100,000. In this paper, we use
an HP-ﬁlter with the more standard smoothing parameter of 1600.
25measure of the EE rate cannot be constructed because the CPS did not collect data on
job-to-job transitions.
We measure vacancies with the Conference Board Help-Wanted Index. Over the period
1951(I)-2006(II), the contemporaneous correlation between cyclical vacancies and cyclical
unemployment is -.92. Over the same period, the standard deviation of cyclical vacancies is
10 percent higher than the standard deviation of cyclical unemployment.
Finally, in order to calibrate the probability distribution of the match-speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t
of productivity, we use information about the duration of employment relationships in the
US labor market. In particular, we use the measure of the distribution of workers across
tenure lengths that Diebold, Neumark and Polsky (1997) have constructed from the 1987
CPS tenure supplement. This tenure distribution is plotted in Figure 1.
5.2 Calibration Strategy
With the data described in the previous paragraphs, we need to calibrate the household’s
preferences {b,β}, the search technology {λu,λ e,p,δ}, and the production technology {k,Z,f,Y,φ}.
For the sake of simplicity, we restrict attention to job-ﬁnding probability functions of the
form p(θ)=m i n {1,θ
γ}, γ ∈ (0,1). W ea l s or e s t r i c tt h ed i s t r i b u t i o no ft h ei d i o s y n c r a t i c
component of productivity to be a 1,000 point approximation of a Weibull distribution with
mean μz, scale σz,a n ds h a p eαz.15 The aggregate component of productivity obeys a 3-state
Markov process with unconditional mean μy, standard deviation σy, and autocorrelation ρy.
Without loss of generality, we normalize μy t o1a n dμz to 0.
We choose one month as the length of a model period. We set β so that the annual
interest rate in the model is 5 percent. We set the vacancy cost k, the scale parameter in
the distribution function of the idiosyncratic component of productivity σz, and the search
probability λe so that the average UE, EU and EE rates are the same in the model as in the


























where Γ is the gamma function.With this distribution, we will be able to use αz in matching the tenure
distribution and σz in matching the EU rate. In contrast, if f (z) is the normal or the lognormal distribution,
one parameter (i.e., the standard deviation) is forced to serve both roles in the calibration.
26data (see Table 1). We set the search probability λu to 1 because it is diﬃcult to identify it
separately from k and λe.
Our strategy for calibrating the remaining parameters is less standard and deserves some
discussion. In the model, the parameter γ determines the elasticity of the UE rate with
respect to the tightness of the submarket visited by unemployed workers, θu.M o r e o v e r ,
since a disproportionate number of vacancies are created in this submarket, the parameter
γ is positively correlated with the elasticity of the UE rate with respect to the ratio between
total vacancies and unemployment. Therefore, even without data on θu,w ea r ea b l et o
identify γ from the coeﬃcient of log(v/u) in the regression of loghue.
In the model, the shape parameter in the density function of idiosyncratic productivity,
αz, and the exogenous separation rate, δ,a ﬀect the shape of the hazard/tenure proﬁle, i.e.,
the probability that a worker leaves his job as a function of tenure. A higher αz reduces the
skewness of the probability distribution of the match-speciﬁc component of productivity. In
turn, this tends to reduce the hazard rate at short tenures (1 to 2 years) and to increase it
at medium tenures (2 to 4 years). In contrast, a higher δ increases the hazard rate at all
tenures, including long ones (more than 4 years). Therefore, we are able to identify both αz
and δ by minimizing the distance between the tenure distribution generated by the model
and its empirical counterpart.16
In the model, the ratio between the productivity of labor at home and in the market is
b/(y +
P
i zig(zi)). In the US economy, Hall and Milgrom (2008) estimate the ratio between
labor productivity at home and in the market to be 71 percent. Therefore, we can identify the
parameter b by equating the productivity ratio in the model and in the data17. Finally, we
choose σy and ρy so that the average productivity of labor has the same standard deviation
and autocorrelation in the model and in the data.
16Moscarini (2003) uses the same strategy and the same data to calibrate an on-the-job search model in
which workers and ﬁrms receive noisy signals about the unobservable quality of their match.
17Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) set b so that the average cost of recruiting a worker is the same in
the model and in the data. Given this calibration target, Hagedorn and Manovskii ﬁnd that the relative
productivity of labor at home and in the market is approximately 90 percent. If we were to set the produc-
tivity ratio to 0.90 rather than 0.71, our model would predict an even larger response of unemplyoment and
vacancies to a given shock to the aggregate component of productivity.
275.3 Calibration Outcomes
Column a in Table 2 contains the results of our calibration. Most notably, we ﬁnd that
employed workers have the opportunity of searching the labor market nearly as often as
unemployed workers (λe =0 .83, λu =1 ) . Yet, the rate at which employed workers move
from one employer to the other is 20 times smaller than the rate at which unemployed workers
become employed because the latter seek jobs that oﬀer less generous terms of trade and are
easier to ﬁnd.
We also ﬁnd that there is a great deal of uncertainty about the productivity of a new
match. At the ninetieth percentile of the probability distribution f(z), the productivity of a
match is twice as large as at the tenth percentile. However, because the survival probability
of a match is endogenous, not all of this uncertainty translates into dispersion in the cross-
sectional productivity distribution g(z). At the ninetieth percentile of g(z), the productivity
of a match is only 1.3 times as large as at the tenth percentile. This process of endogenous
selection also creates a large wedge between the expected productivity of a new match
and the average of the cross-sectional productivity distribution. In particular, the expected
productivity of a new match, μy +
P
zif(zi), is equal to 1, while the cross-sectional average
productivity of a match, apl =( 1− u)−1 P
(μy + zi)g(zi), is 1.37.
6 Business Cycle Analysis
In this section, we use the calibrated model to measure the contribution of aggregate produc-
tivity shocks (henceforth, y-shocks) to the cyclical volatility of US unemployment, vacancies
and other labor market variables. Then, we compare these measurements with those that an
economist would obtain if he were to use a version of the model in which the EU and EE rates
are exogenous. From this comparison, it will be clear that, in order to properly measure the
contribution of shocks to the cyclical volatility of the US labor market, an economist needs
a model in which not only the UE, but also the EU and EE rates are endogenous. These
two measurement exercises are carried out in the second and third part of the section. In
the ﬁrst part of the section, as a preliminary step, we use the calibrated model to measure
the response of the US labor market to a 1 percent increase in the aggregate component of
productivity.
286.1 Response to a Productivity Shock
In order to study the response of the labor market to a 1 percent increase in the aggre-
gate component of productivity, we ﬁr s tc o m p u t et h eB l o c kR e c u r s i v eE q u i l i b r i u mo fo u r
calibrated model. Then, we feed into the model the sequence of realizations of aggregate
component of productivity {yt},w h e r eyt = μy for all t ≤ 9,000 and yt =1 .01 · μy for
all t>9,000. F i n a l l y ,w ec a l c u l a t et h ep e r c e n t a g ec h a n g ei nu n e m p l o y m e n t ,v a c a n c i e s
and other labor market variables in response to the increase in the aggregate component of
productivity.
The ﬁrm’s and worker’s joint value of a match increases when the aggregate productivity
shock hits the economy. In response to the increase in the value of a match, ﬁrms open
more vacancies per applicant in every submarket x. In response to the increase in the labor
market tightness, unemployed workers choose to visit submarkets in which vacancies oﬀer
more generous terms of trade and the probability of trade is higher. Similarly, employed
workers choose, on average, to visit submarkets in which both the terms-of-trade and the
probability of trade are higher. Therefore, the UE and EE rates increase. In contrast, the
EU rate decreases because the increase in the aggregate component of productivity induces
workers and ﬁrms to keep matches that previously they would have destroyed. Since the rate
at which workers ﬂow out of unemployment decreases and the rate at which workers ﬂow
into unemployment increases, the unemployment rate unambiguously falls. More precisely,
a 1 percent increase in the aggregate component of productivity leads to a 2 percent increase
in the UE rate, a 6 percent increase in the EE rate, a 6 percent decrease in the EU rate, and
an 8 percent decrease in the unemployment rate (see Figure 3).
When the aggregate productivity shock hits the economy, ﬁrms open more vacancies for
each unemployed worker. However, since the number of workers who are unemployed falls
so much, ﬁrms end up opening fewer vacancies for this group of workers. Similarly, when
the shock hits the economy, ﬁrms create more vacancies for each employed worker. Since the
number of employed workers increases, ﬁrms increase the number of vacancies opened for
this second group of workers. Overall, vacancies increase by approximately 3 percent (see
Figure 4).
When the shock to the aggregate component of productivity hits the economy, the distrib-
29ution of employed workers across jobs with diﬀerent match-speciﬁc productivities is subject
to two opposing forces. On the one hand, the increase in aggregate productivity induces
ﬁrms and workers to keep some low productivity matches that they would have previously
destroyed. This ﬁrst force tends to worsen (in the stochastic dominance sense) the distribu-
tion of match-speciﬁc productivities. On the other hand, in response to the shock, workers
employed at low-productivity jobs search in tighter submarkets. This second force tends to
improve the distribution of match-speciﬁc productivities. Figures 5 and 6 show that the ﬁrst
force dominates the second one.
In Figure 5, we plot the impulse response function of the fraction of workers employed at
jobs with idiosyncratic productivity z lower than 0.23 (i.e., the 10th percentile of the ergodic
distribution of match-speciﬁc productivities), greater than 0.23 and lower than 0.29 (i.e., the
20th percentile of the ergodic distribution of match-speciﬁc productivities), and greater than
0.29. In Figure 5, we see that the fraction of workers employed at the least productive class of
jobs increases by more than 2 percent; the fraction of workers employed at the intermediate
class of jobs increases by 0.5 percent; and the fraction of workers employed at the most
productive jobs decreases by 0.5 percent. Overall, the average of the distribution of match-
speciﬁc productivities falls by 0.4 percent in response to the shock. As a consequence, a 1
percent increase in the aggregate component of productivity does not increase the average
productivity of labor by 1·(μy/apl)=0 .73 percent, but only by 0.65 percent (see Figure 6).
6.2 Productivity Shocks and Business Cycles
How much of the cyclical ﬂuctuations in the US labor market are driven by aggregate produc-
tivity shocks? In order to answer this question, we compute the Block Recursive Equilibrium
of our calibrated model. Then, we draw a realization of the calibrated stochastic process
for the aggregate component of productivity y, and we compute the quarterly time series
of unemployment, vacancies and other labor market variables.18 Finally, we pass the log of
these series through an HP-ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter 1600.
Table 3 contains a statistical summary of our simulated data. The ﬁrst lesson that we
draw from these tables is that y-shocks generate ﬂuctuations in the EU transition rate that
18Since the model is monthly, we measure the quarterly time series of unemployment, vacancy and tran-
sition rates by taking 3-months averages of the monthly rates generated by the model.
30are negatively correlated with the ﬂuctuations in the average productivity of labor and are
approximately 8.5 times as large. In addition, y-shocks generate ﬂuctuations in the UE
transition rate that are positively correlated with average productivity ﬂuctuations and are
3 times as large. As a result, unemployment moves in the opposite direction of average
productivity and it is 10.5 times more volatile.
The second lesson that we draw from Table 3 is that y-shocks generate ﬂuctuations in
the number of vacancies created for unemployed workers that are positively correlated with
the ﬂuctuations in unemployment and are 0.65 times as volatile. Also, y-shocks generate
ﬂuctuations in the number of vacancies created for employed workers that are negatively
correlated with the ﬂuctuations in unemployment and are 1.1 times as volatile. Overall,
total vacancies move in the opposite direction of unemployment and are approximately 0.4
t i m e sa sv o l a t i l e .
By comparing Tables 1 and 3, we ﬁnd that aggregate productivity shocks account for
40 percent of the UE rate volatility that is observed in the US economy over the period
1951(I) - 2006(II); and they account for approximately all of the observed volatility of the
EU transition rate. Overall, aggregate productivity shocks alone can account for more than
80 percent of the observed unemployment volatility. Moreover, we ﬁnd that y-shocks account
for more than 30 percent of the volatility of vacancies and for the nearly perfectly negative
correlation between unemployment and vacancies (i.e., the Beveridge curve). Finally, we
ﬁnd that y-shocks can precisely reproduce the matrix of correlations between unemployment,
vacancies and the workers’ transition rates across diﬀerent employment states. In light of
these ﬁndings, we conclude that aggregate productivity shocks may well be the fundamental
source of cyclical ﬂuctuations in the US labor market.
However, aggregate productivity shocks cannot be the only cause of the US business
cycles. First of all, y-shocks alone generate a counterfactually strong correlation between
average labor productivity and other labor market variables (e.g. unemployment, vacancies,
etc.).19 Second, y-shocks alone generate too much unemployment volatility through ﬂuctua-
tions in the EU rate and too little of it through ﬂuctuations in the UE rate. Finally, y-shocks
19Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) make a similar point. They argue that, since the empirical correlation
between unemployment and labor productivity is signiﬁcantly smaller than 1, the “true model” of the labor
market must be such that productivity shocks account for only a fraction of the cyclical ﬂuctuations in
unemployment.
31leave more than half of the observed volatility of vacancies unexplained.
6.3 Comparisons with the Canonical Search Model
At the beginning of this paper, we conjectured that, if an economist wants to properly
measure the contribution of aggregate productivity shocks to the cyclical ﬂuctuations of
unemployment and vacancies, he should use a model in which not only the UE rate, but also
the EU and EE rates are endogenous.
In order to test this conjecture, we add the constraints σz =0and λe =0to our model.
The ﬁrst constraint states that the idiosyncratic component of productivity is the same for
all matches and, hence, it implies that the EU transition rate is exogenous. The second
constraint states that employed workers do not have the opportunity of searching for better
jobs and, hence, it implies that the EE transition rate is exogenous. As it turns out, the
constrained version of our model coincides with the canonical search model of Pissarides
(1985, 2000), and Shimer (2005). We then recalibrate the constrained version of our model
using the same targets that we used in Section 5.2, with the obvious exclusion of the EE
transition rate and the tenure distribution. The results of this calibration are reported as
column b in Table 2. Finally, we solve for the Block Recursive Equilibrium of the constrained
model, draw a realization for the stochastic process of y, and compute the time series for
unemployment, vacancies and other labor market variables. The results of this simulation
are reported in Table 4.
A c c o r d i n gt ot h ec o n s t r a i n e dm o d e l ,y-shocks generate ﬂuctuations in the unemployment
rate that are negatively correlated with the ﬂuctuations in the average productivity of labor
and are 0.6 times as volatile. Also, according to the constrained model, y-shocks generate
ﬂuctuations in the vacancy rate that are positively correlated with the ﬂuctuations in the
average productivity of labor and are 2.5 times as volatile. By comparing these statistics
with those reported in Table 3, we conclude that, if an economist uses a version of our model
in which the EU and EE rates are exogenous (i.e., if an economist uses the canonical search
model), he is going to dramatically underestimate the fraction of the cyclical volatility of
unemployment and vacancies that is caused by aggregate productivity shocks.
Next, we want to understand why the canonical search model and ours produce such
32diﬀerent estimates of the contribution of aggregate productivity shocks to the cyclical ﬂuc-
tuations of vacancies and unemployment. First, in our model, when a positive productivity
shock hits the economy, the EU transition rate falls because workers and ﬁrms become less
selective about the idiosyncratic productivity of the matches that they are willing to keep.
In the canonical search model, when a positive productivity shock hits the economy, the EU
transition rate does not change because all matches are constrained to be identical. For this
reason, the same productivity shock tends to generate a smaller decline in unemployment in
the canonical search model than in ours (see Figures 3 and 7).
Second, in our model, a positive shock to the aggregate component of productivity leads
to a decline in the number of vacancies that are created for unemployed workers and to an
increase in the number of vacancies that are created for employed workers. In contrast, in the
canonical search model, a positive y-shock leads to an increase in the number of vacancies
that ﬁrms open for unemployed workers, because the unemployment rate decreases much
less than in our model. Moreover, in the canonical search model, a positive y-shock does
not aﬀect the number of vacancies created for employed workers because λe =0 .T h e r e f o r e ,
the canonical search model distorts in opposite directions the estimates of the eﬀect that a
y-shock has on the number of vacancies created for unemployed and employed workers. As a
result, the canonical search model distorts only marginally the estimated eﬀect of a y-shock
on the total vacancy rate (see Figures 4 and 8).
Third, in our model, a 1 percent increase in the aggregate component of productivity
does not increase the average productivity of labor by 1 · (μy/apl)=0 .73 percent, but only
by 0.65 percent because workers and ﬁrms become less selective about the quality of the
matches that they are willing to keep. In the canonical search model, a 1 percent increase in
the aggregate component of productivity translates into a 0.73 percent increase in average
productivity because all matches are identical. Since both models are calibrated to match
the empirical volatility of the average productivity of labor, y-shocks are approximately 12
percent smaller in the canonical model than in ours. In turn, smaller y-shocks generate
smaller ﬂuctuations in unemployment and vacancies.
Fourth, the eﬀect of productivity shocks in the two models diﬀers because the calibrated
elasticity of the job-ﬁnding probability is diﬀerent. That is, the two models have diﬀerent
33values of the parameter γ in the job-ﬁnding probability function p(θ)=m i n {θ
γ,1}.I nb o t h
models, the calibrated value of γ is such that the elasticity of the UE rate with respect to the
vacancy/unemployment ratio is the same in the model as in the data, namely 0.22. Therefore,
in both models, the calibrated value of γ is equal to 0.22 · [∆log(v/u)/∆logθu],w h e r eθu
is the tightness of the submarket visited by unemployed workers. In our model, because
the number of vacancies created for employed workers moves together with θu, ∆log(v/u) is
greater than ∆logθu. As a result, the calibrated value of γ is 0.65. In the canonical model,
b e c a u s ew o r k e r sa r en o ta l l o w e dt os e a r c ho nt h ej o b ,v/u is equal to θu and so γ is equal to
0.22.20 In turn, a smaller γ implies that the EU rate (and, consequently, the unemployment
rate) is less responsive to a given shock to the aggregate component of productivity.
From this discussion, it is clear that, in order to properly measure the contribution of y-
shocks to the cyclical ﬂuctuations of the US labor market, an economist needs to endogenize
both the EU and the EE rate along with the UE rate. For example, if an economist uses
a version of our model in which the UE and EU rates are endogenous, but the EE rate
is exogenous (because λe is constrained to be 0), he underestimates the elasticity of the
job-ﬁnding probability with respect to the vacancy/applicant ratio. For this reason, he
underestimates the contribution of y-shocks to the volatility of the UE rate and, consequently,
of the unemployment rate. Moreover, he ignores the eﬀect that y-shocks have on the number
of vacancies created for employed workers. For this reason, he incorrectly concludes that y-
shocks generate ﬂuctuations in unemployment and vacancies that are positively correlated21.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In the ﬁrst part of this paper, we have built a directed search model of the labor market
in which the workers’ transitions between employment, unemployment and across employers
are endogenous. For this model, we have proved existence, uniqueness and eﬃciency of
a recursive equilibrium with the property that the distribution of workers across diﬀerent
20Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) make a similar point. They consider a reduced-form model of the
labor market in which the log of the measure of workers who search on the job is proportional to the log
of the vacancy/unemployment ratio. In such model, the coeﬃcient of log(v/u) in the regression of log(hue)
provides a (downward) biased estimate of the elasticity γ of the job-ﬁnding probability function with respect
to vacancies.
21All the details about this measurement exercise are available upon request.
34jobs is a state variable which does not aﬀect the agents’ value and policy functions, or the
tightness function. Because of this property, the computation of the eﬃcient equilibrium is
as simple as the computation of the equilibrium of a model without heterogeneity.
In the second paper of this paper, we have calibrated our model to match the features
of workers’ turnover in the US labor market over the period 1951(I)-2006(II). Then, we
have used the calibrated model to measure the eﬀect of aggregate productivity shocks on the
volatility of unemployment and vacancies. We have found that aggregate productivity shocks
alone account for approximately 50 percent of the cyclical ﬂuctuations in the UE transition
rate and for all of the cyclical ﬂuctuations in the EU transition rate. As a result, productivity
shocks alone can explain more than 80 percent of the cyclical volatility of unemployment.
We have found that productivity shocks generate large countercyclical ﬂuctuations in the
number of vacancies created for unemployed workers and larger procyclical ﬂuctuations in
the number of vacancies created for employed workers. Overall, productivity shocks alone
can account for 30 percent of the cyclical volatility of vacancies, as well as for the strong
negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment.
By comparing these measurements with those derived using the canonical search model
of Pissarides (1985), we have vindicated our initial conjecture. That is, in order to properly
assess the eﬀect of productivity shocks on unemployment and vacancies, an economist needs
a model, such as ours, in which the workers’ transitions between employment, unemployment
and across employers are all endogenous.
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37Appendix
AJ o i n t V a l u e o f a M a t c h
The deﬁnition of V (z;y) is
V (z;y)=m a x a∈A[W(z;y|a)+J(z;y|a)].( A 1 )
First, notice that the allocation a = {w,τ,n} ∪ ˆ a belongs to the set A if and only if w ∈ R,
τ : Y → [δ,1], n : Y → R,a n dˆ a : Y → A. Second, notice that the worker’s lifetime utility
W(z;y|a) is equal to the RHS of equation (R2) and the ﬁrm’s lifetime proﬁts J(z;y|a) are
equal to the RHS of equation (R3). In light of these observations, we can rewrite (A1) as
V (z;y)= m a x
w,τ,n,ˆ a
y + z + βE{τ(ˆ y)U(ˆ y)+[ 1− τ(ˆ y)]λep(θ(n(ˆ y); ˆ y))n(ˆ y)}+
+βE{[1 − τ(ˆ y)][1 − λep(θ(n(ˆ y); ˆ y))][J(z;ˆ y|ˆ a(ˆ y)) + W(z;ˆ y|ˆ a(ˆ y))]},
w ∈ R,τ: Y → [δ,1],n : Y → R, ˆ a : Y → A.
(A2)
Now, notice that both the probability that the match survives during the separation stage,
i.e. 1 − τ(ˆ y), and the probability that the match survives during the search stage, i.e.
1 − λep(θ(n(ˆ y); ˆ y)), are non negative numbers. In light of this observation, we can rewrite
(A2) as
V (z;y)= m a x
w,d,n
y + z + βE{τ(ˆ y)U(ˆ y)+[ 1− τ(ˆ y)]λep(θ(n(ˆ y); ˆ y))n(ˆ y)}+
+βE{[1 − τ(ˆ y)][1 − λep(θ(n(ˆ y); ˆ y))]max
ˆ a∈A
[J(z;ˆ y|ˆ a)+W(z;ˆ y|ˆ a)]},
w ∈ R,τ: Y → [δ,1],n : Y → R.
(A3)
Finally, notice that the maximum of the sum between the worker’s continuation utility
W(z;ˆ y|ˆ a) and the ﬁrm’s continuation proﬁts J(z;ˆ y|ˆ a) is equal to V (z;ˆ y). Therefore, (A3) is
equal to equation (R5) in the main text. ¥
B Proof of Proposition 1
Let the contract a be a feasible choice for the ﬁrm’s problem (R6). First, notice that, for
any realization zi of the idiosyncratic component of productivity, the contract a prescribes
an allocation a(zi) which may not necessarily maximize the joint value of the match, i.e.
W(zi;y|a(zi))+J(zi;y|a(zi)) is smaller than or equal to V (zi;y). Second, notice that, since a
38is feasible, it provides the worker with the lifetime utility x,i . e .
P
i W(zi;y|a(zi))f(zi)=x.










i V (zi;y)f(zi) − x.
(A4)




t=0 that has the following properties: (a) τ∗
t−1(z;yt)=
1 iﬀ U(yt) >V(z;yt)+λeD(V (z;yt);yt) and τ∗
t−1(z;yt)=δ otherwise, for all {z;yt} ∈ Z×Y t,
t =1 ,2,...;( b )n∗




i W(zi;y|a∗(zi))f(zi)=x. First, notice that, for any realization zi of the
idiosyncratic component of productivity, the contract a∗ prescribes an allocation a∗(zi)w h i c h
maximizes the joint value of the match. Second, notice that a∗ provides the worker with the
lifetime utility x. In light of these two observations, it follows that the contract a∗ provides









i V (zi;y)f(zi) − x.
(A5)
The contract a∗ is a feasible choice for the ﬁrm’s problem (R6), and it provides the ﬁrm with
more proﬁts than any other feasible choice. Hence, it is optimal.
Finally, the reader can easily verify that, if a contract {wt,τt,n t}∞
t=0 solves the ﬁrm’s problem
(R6), then it maximizes the joint value of the match. Hence, the contract {wt,τt,n t}∞
t=0
prescribes that (a) τt−1(z;yt)=1iﬀ U(yt) >V(z;yt)+λeD(V (z;yt);yt) and τt−1(z;yt)=δ
otherwise, for all {z;yt} ∈ Z × Y t, t =1 ,2,...;( b )nt−1(z;yt)=m(V (z;yt);yt), for all
{z;yt} ∈ Z × Y t, t =1 ,2,... ¥
C Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Let Ψ denote the set Y × [0,1]N(z)+1.L e t C(Ψ) denote the set of bounded continuous
functions r : Ψ → R,w i t ht h es u pn o r m .D e ﬁne the operator T on C(Ψ) by




s.t. ˆ u = u[1 − λup(θu)] +
P
i d(zi)g(zi),
ˆ g(z)=h(ψ)f(z)+[ 1− d(z)][1 − λep(θz(z))]g(z),






39For each r ∈ C(Ψ) and ψ ∈ Ψ, the problem in (A6) is to maximize a continuous function
over a compact set. Hence the maximum is attained and the argmax is non-empty. Since
both F and r are bounded, Tr is also bounded; and since F and r are continuous, it follows
from the Theorem of the Maximum (see Stokey, Lucas and Prescott 1989, page 62) that Tr
is also continuous. Hence, the operator T maps C(Ψ) into itself.
Since the operator T satisﬁes the remaining hypotheses of Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions
for a contraction (see Stokey, Lucas and Prescott 1989, page 54), it follows that T has a
unique ﬁxed point ˜ s ∈ C(Ψ).A n ds i n c elimt→∞ β
t˜ s(ψ)=0for all ψ ∈ Ψ, it follows that the
ﬁxed point ˜ s is equal to the value of the plan s0.
(ii) Let L(Ψ) denote the set of bounded continuous functions r : Ψ → R that are linear in
the measure u of unemployed workers as well as in the measure g(z) of workers employed at




Given a function r in L(Ψ), consider the problem (A6). For each ψ ∈ Ψ, the necessary
condition for the optimality of θu is:
k ≥ p
0(θu){y − b + βE[
P
i rz(zi;ˆ y)f(zi) − ru(ˆ y)]} (A7)
and θu ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. Since the function p0(θ) is strictly decreasing in
θ, there is at most one θu that satisﬁes condition (A7). Hence the optimum is unique. Since
(A7) depends on ψ only through y, the optimal policy is a function ˜ θu : Y → [0,θ].




i rz(zi;ˆ y)f(zi) − rz(z;ˆ y)]} (A8)
and θz(z) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. Since p0(θ) is strictly decreasing in θ,t h e r ei s
at most one θz(z) that satisﬁes condition (A8). Hence the optimum is unique. Since (A8)
depends on ψ only through y,t h eo p t i m a lp o l i c yi saf u n c t i o n˜ θz : Z × Y → [0,θ].
For each ψ ∈ Ψ, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the optimality of d is d(z)=1if





40and d(z)=δ otherwise. Since (A9) does not depend on d,t h e r ei se x a c t l yo n ed that satisﬁes
condition (A8). Since (A9) depends on ψ only through y, the optimal policy is a function
˜ d : Z × Y → [δ,1].
Deﬁne the function ˜ ru : Y → R by
˜ ru(y)= −kλu˜ θu(y)+
h
1 − λup(˜ θu(y))
i
[b + βEru(ˆ y)]+




And deﬁne the function ˜ rz : Z × Y → R by
˜ rz(z;y)= ˜ d(z;y)[b + βEru(ˆ y)] − [1 − ˜ d(z;y)]kλe˜ θz(z;y)+
+[1 − ˜ d(z;y)]
h
1 − λep(˜ θz(z;y))
i
[y + z + βErz(z;ˆ y)]+








Hence, the operator T maps L(Ψ) into itself. Since L(Ψ) is a closed subset of C(Ψ), it follows
that the ﬁxed point s0 of the operator T belongs to L(Ψ) (see Stokey, Lucas and Prescott
1989, page 52).
(iii) Let M(Ψ) denote the set of functions r : Ψ → R such that r ∈ L(Ψ) and rz : Z×Y → R
is non decreasing in z. Given a function r ∈ M(Ψ),l e t˜ r denote Tr.A sw ep r o v e di np a r t
(ii), the function ˜ r belongs to the set L(Ψ). Also as we proved in part (ii), the derivative
˜ rz(z;y) is equal to (A10). Using the optimality conditions (A7)—(A9), we can rewrite (A10)
as
˜ rz (z,y)= b + βEru (y+)+m a x d∈[δ,1]{(1 − d)[y + z − b + βE[rz (z,ˆ y) − ru (ˆ y)]]
+(1− d)λe maxθ∈R+[−kθ + p(θ)[−z + βE[
P
i rz (z,ˆ y)f(zi) − rz (z,ˆ y)]]]}.
Since rz(z;y) is non decreasing in z,i tf o l l o w st h a t˜ rz(z2;y) ≥ ˜ rz(z1;y) for all z2 ≥ z1. Hence,
the operator T maps the set M(Ψ) into itself. Since M(Ψ) is a closed subset of L(Ψ),i t
follows that the ﬁxed point s0 belongs to M(Ψ) as well. ¥
41DP r o o f o f T h e o r e m 3
(i) We want to prove that a Block Recursive Equilibrium exists. To this aim, we ﬁrst
construct a supposed equilibrium {D∗,m ∗,U∗,V∗,d ∗,θ
∗} from the solution to the social
planner’s problem. Then, we verify that the putative equilibrium satisﬁes conditions (i)—(iv)
in Deﬁnition 1.
In the supposed equilibrium, the worker’s value from unemployment U∗(y) is set equal to b+
βEs0
u(ˆ y),w h e r es0
u is the derivative of the social planner’s value function s0 with respect to the
unemployment rate. The ﬁrm’s and worker’s joint value from a match V ∗(z;y) is set equal to
y+z+βEs0
z(z;ˆ y),w h e r es0
z is the derivative of the social planner’s value function with respect
to g(z). The market tightness function θ
∗(x;y) is set equal to q−1(k/(
P
i V ∗(zi;y)f(zi)−x))
for all x ≤ ˜ x(y);a n dθ
∗(x;y) is set equal to zero for all x>˜ x(y). Finally, the worker’s search
value function D∗(υ;y) and policy function m∗(υ;y) are set equal to the maximum and the
maximizer of p(θ
∗(x;y)) (x − υ).
By construction, the market tightness function θ
∗ satisﬁes the equilibrium condition (i). Also
by construction, the worker’s search value D∗ and policy m∗ satisfy the equilibrium condition







∗(zi;y)f(zi) − υ]},( A 1 2 )
and D∗(υ;y) is the maximum of the problem in (A12). Hence the tightness θ
∗
u(y) of the
submarket visited by unemployed workers satisﬁes the optimality condition (E3); and the
tightness θ
∗
z(z;y) of the submarket visited by employed workers satisﬁes the optimality con-
dition (E4). Since U∗(y) is equal to b+βEs0
u(ˆ y) and V ∗(z;y) is equal to y+z+βEs0
z(z;ˆ y),t h e
tightness θ
∗
u(y) also satisﬁes the necessary condition (P3) for the optimality of the solution
to the social planner’s problem. Since (P3) admits only one solution, θ
∗
u(y) is equal to θ
0
u(y).
Similarly, we can prove that θ
∗
z(z;y) is equal to θ
0
z(z;y) and that d∗(z;y) is equal to d0(z;y).
Since θ
0
u(y) is equal to θ
∗











u(ˆ y)=b + βE[U
∗(ˆ y)+λuD
∗(U
∗(ˆ y); ˆ y))]. (A14)
Hence U∗(y) satisﬁes the equilibrium condition (iii). Similarly, we can prove that the ﬁrm’s
and worker’s joint value from a match V ∗(z;y) satisﬁes the equilibrium condition (iv).
(ii) We want to prove that any equilibrium is eﬃcient. To this aim, let {D∗,m ∗,U∗,V∗,d ∗,θ
∗}
denote a Block Recursive Equilibrium. Let s∗
u(y) denote the worker’s value of unemployment
at the beginning of the separation stage, i.e. U∗(y)+λuD∗(U∗(y);y).L e t s∗
z(z;y) denote
the ﬁrm’s and worker’s joint value of a match at the beginning of the separation stage, i.e.
V ∗(z;y)+λeD∗(V ∗(z;y);y).L e t θ
∗
u(y) denote the tightness of the submarket visited by
unemployed workers, i.e. θ
∗
u(y)=θ
∗(m∗(U∗(y);y);y).A n dl e tθ
∗
z(z;y) denote the tightness





Deﬁne the function r : Ψ → R as ru(y)u +
P
rz(z;y)g(zi),w h e r eru(y) is equal to s∗
u(y)
and rz(z;y) is equal to s∗
z(z;y). Given the function r, consider the problem (A6). For each
(y,u,g) ∈ Ψ,t h eo p t i m a lm a r k e tt i g h t n e s s˜ θu(y) satisﬁes the condition
k ≥ p
0(˜ θu(y)){y − b + βE[
P
i rz(zi;ˆ y)f(zi) − ru(ˆ y)]} (A15)
and ˜ θu(y) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. Since rz(zi;ˆ y)=s∗
z(zi;ˆ y) and ru(ˆ y)=s∗
u(ˆ y),
˜ θu(y) also satisﬁes condition (E4). Since (E4) admits only one solution, ˜ θu(y) is equal to
θ
∗
u(y). Similarly, we can prove that the optimal tightness ˜ θz(z;y) is equal to θ
∗
z(z;y).A n d
we can prove that the optimal job destruction probability ˜ d(z;y) is equal to d∗(z;y).
Deﬁne the function ˜ r : Ψ → R as Tr.A sw ep r o v e di nP r o p o s i t i o n2 ,˜ r belongs to the set
L(Ψ). As we also proved in Proposition 2, the derivative ˜ ru(y) is equal to
˜ ru(y)= −kλu˜ θu(y)+
h
1 − λup(˜ θu(y))
i
[b + βEru(ˆ y)]+





z(zi;ˆ y), ru(ˆ y)=s∗
u(ˆ y) and ˜ θu(y)=θ
∗
u(y), the right hand side of (A16) is
equal to the right hand side of (E5). Hence ˜ ru(y) is equal to s∗
u(y). Similarly, we can prove
43that ˜ rz(z;y) is equal to s∗








S i n c ei ti saﬁxed point of the operator T, r is equal to the social planner’s value function











Table 1: U.S. Quarterly Data, 1951:I—2006:II
uv h ue heu hee apl
Average .056 63.9 .452 .026 .029 84.2
R e l a t i v e S t d 1 2 . 21 3 . 57 . 5 67 . 0 34 . 1 5 1
Quarterly Acr .873 .905 .820 .692 .595 .761
Unemployment u 1 -.919 -.920 .777 -.631 -.250
Vacancies v – 1 .907 -.784 .661 .410
UE Rate hue – – 1 -.677 .664 .258
EU Rate heu – – – 1 -.289 -.480
EE Rate hee –––– 1. 1 7 3
Average Prod apl ––––– 1
Source: Own calculations using data from the BLS.
Table 2: Calibration Outcomes
Description (a) Baseline (b) P85 Target
β discount rate .996 .996 real interest rate
b home productivity .987 .987 home/mkt prod.
λu oﬀ the job search prob. 1 1 normalization
λe on the job search prob. .833 – EE rate
γ elasticity of p wrt θ .650 .220 reg. coef. of v/u on hue
k vacancy cost 1.77 2.84 UE rate
δ destruction prob. .011 .027 tenure distribution
μz average idios. prod. 0 .371 normalization
σz scale idios. prod. 1.17 – EU rate
αz shape idios. prod. 4 – tenure distribution
μy average agg. prod. 1 1 normalization
σy std. agg. prod. 1.52 1.36 std. average prod.
ρy autocorr. agg. prod. 0.76 0.76 std. average prod.
45.
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Table 3: Productivity Shocks
uvv u ve hue heu hee apl
R e l a t i v e S t d 1 0 . 54 . 0 66 . 7 41 1 . 72 . 9 88 . 7 98 . 6 6 1
Quarterly Acr .837 .650 .771 .792 .775 .762 .792 .778
Unemployment u 1 -.812 .877 -.974 -.969 .971 -.970 -.971
Vacancies v –1 -.458 .890 .909 -.894 .895 .901
Vac for Un vu – – 1 -.747 -.746 .749 -.786 -.756
Vac for Emp ve – – – 1 .990 -.957 .999 .988
UE Rate hue –––– 1 - . 9 7 0 . 9 8 8 . 9 9 9
EU Rate heu ––––– 1 - . 9 5 4 - . 9 7 2
EE Rate hee –––––– 1. 9 8 6
Average Prod apl ––––––– 1
Table 4: Productivity Shocks in P85
uv h ue heu hee apl
Relative Std .667 2.78 .742 0 – 1
Quarterly Acr .826 .726 .770 1 – .771
Unemployment u 1 -.946 -.974 0 – -.974
Vacancies v – 1 .994 0 – .994
UE Rate hue – – 1 0 – .999
EU Rate heu ––– 1 – 0
EE Rate hee ––––––
Average Prod apl ––––– 1
49.
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